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Is JUDICIAL DISSENT CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED?
ANDREW LYNCH*
You cannot impose a regime of joint judgments onjudges who hold
conflicting views. Judicial integrity cannot be compromised.
Sir Anthony Mason'
I INTRODUCTION
The ability of a judge to publish an opinion which rejects the reasoning of his or her
colleagues and explains how the majority has fallen into error is surely one of the
key indicators of a robust and independent judicial system. A neutered judiciary
firmly in the grip of another arm of government would hardly require a mechanism
for the airing of disagreement. Conversely, the strong tradition of individual
expression which the possibility of dissent most clearly emphasises, poses a real
obstacle to those who might attempt the intimidation of judicial institutions. As
Justice Douglas of the United States Supreme Court dramatically argued in the
middle of last century:
Certainty and unanimity in the law are possible both under the fascist and communist
systems. They are not only possible; they are indispensable; for complete
subservience to the political regime is a sine qua non to judicial survival under either
system. One cannot imagine the courts of Hitler engaged in a public debate over the
principles of Der FUhrer, with a minority of one or four deploring or denouncing the
principles themselves. One cannot imagine a judge of a communist court dissenting
against the decrees of the Kremlin ... 2
The presence of dissenting judgments is one factor which provides reassurance that
the courts are staffed by judges beholden to nothing more powerful than their own
individual appreciation of the state of the law. If the judges are prepared to disagree
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with each other on occasion, then it seems reasonable to presume they will have no
qualms about disagreeing with the executive and legislature as well when the need
anses.
However, dissenting judgments seem to have been rarely appreciated as a bulwark
of judicial independence. Historically, the emergence of dissent in domestic courts
seems to have occurred more at the instigation of a few determined individuals than
as a feature clearly rooted in the constitutional importance of separation of powers.
We would not normally conceive of an attempt to stifle dissent as an interference
with the courts amounting to a breach of the separation of judicial power. This is
due largely to the dominant form of the rule from the Boilermakers' Case' with its
focus on strict separation of judicial and non-judicial functions. Removing the
independence of, say, the justices of the High Court from each other by requiring
them to file only unanimous opinions, may not necessarily mean that the Court
itself as part of the judicial arm of government has been compromised. As
traditionally conceived, the independence which the separation of powers protects is
institutional, rather than individual.' A ban on dissents without more should not
weaken the judiciary relative to the executive or legislature - especially when one
considers that minority judgments are not binding authoritative statements of the
law.'
R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers' Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254 (' Boilermakers'
Case').
See, eg, Christine Parker, 'Protection of Judicial Process as an Implied Constitutional
Principle' (1994) 16 Adelaide Law Review 341,344, See also, Fiona Wheeler, 'The Rise and
Rise of Judicial Power under Chapter III of the Constitution: A decade in overview' (2000) 20
Australian Bar Review 283, 286, wherein she comments that, despite innovative interpretations
in respect of Chapter III in recent times, cases concerned with the institutional allocation of
power 'continue to be staple fare'.
I have been careful here not to say that dissents are of no legal value - which they clearly are.
See, eg, John Alder, 'Dissents in Courts of Last Resort: Tragic Choices?' (2000) 20 Oxford
Journal of Legal Studies 221; Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 'Remarks on Writing Separately'
(1990) 65 Washington Law Review 133; Alan Barth, Prophets with Honor - Great Dissents
and Great Dissenters in the Supreme Court (1974); Matthew P Bergman, 'Dissent in the
Judicial Process: Discord in Service of Harmony' (1991) 68 Denver University Law Review
79; Justice William J Brennan, 'In Defense of Dissents' (1986) 37 Hastings Law Journal 427;
Douglas, above n 2; Robert G Flanders Jr, 'The Utility of Separate Judicial Opinions in
Appellate Courts of Last Resort: Why Dissents Are Valuable' (1999) 4 Roger Williams
University Law Review 401; Stanley H Fuld, 'The Voices of Dissent' (1962) 62 Columbia Law
Review 923; Claire L 'Heureux-Dube, 'The Dissenting Opinion: Voices of the Future?' (2000)
38 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 495; Donald E Lively, Foreshadows of the Law - Supreme
Court Dissents and Constitutional Development (1992); Andrew Lynch, 'Dissent: The
Rewards and Risks of Judicial Disagreement in the High Court of Australia' (2003) 27
Melbourne University Law Review 724; Andrew Lynch, 'Dissenting Judgments' in T
Blackshield, M Coper and G Williams (eds), The Oxford Companion to the High Court of
Australia (2001) 216-8; R Dean Moorhead, 'Concurring and Dissenting Opinions' (1952) 38
American Bar Association Journal 821; Antonin Scalia, 'The Dissenting Opinion' (1994)
Journal of Supreme Court History 33; and Edward C Voss, 'Dissent: Sign of a Healthy Court'
(1992) 24 Arizona State Law Journal 643.
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However, this purely institutional mindset has, in more recent years, yielded to a
renewed appreciation of the doctrine's purpose as providing significant protection
to individual freedom. The majority in Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander Affairs" recognised that 'the separation of the judicial function from
the other functions of government advances two constitutional objectives: the
guarantee ofliberty and, to that end, the independence of Ch III judges'.' As evident
from this statement, individual liberty requires, in turn, an operation of the
separation of powers doctrine which extends beyond simply requiring a clear
demarcation of institutional functions to affording a basic guarantee that the
exercise of judicial power itself is not tainted, or perhaps even perceived to be so,
by an interference in the internal workings of the courts by the executive or
legislative arms of government. As shall be discussed in Part IV(b) of this paper,
the apotheosis of this view to date is the decision of Nicholas v The Queens though
it attracted support in earlier decisions also. In this light, an attempt to diminish
individual judicial autonomy might be seen as an attack upon the free operation of
judicial method generally. As such, it would challenge those ideals which justify the
prohibition upon interference from the other branches of government.
The purpose of this paper is to consider whether the strict separation of judicial
power implied from the Commonwealth Constitution protects the ability which
judges possess to issue dissenting opinions." Can the guarantee of judicial
independence which Chapter III of the Constitution offers federal courts be
extended to individual judicial officers so that there is, as some judges claim, a
'right to dissent'? Consideration of the relevant case law will demonstrate that, if
protection from interference is to be afforded, the delivery of such opinions will
need to be characterised as an essential feature of the curial process.
II THE POSSIBILITY OF DISSENT
The tradition of the dissenting judicial opinion is a long one and, like much of our
English legal inheritance, betrays little evidence of having been consciously
planned or adopted. The ability to dissent developed through the English courts'
willingness to accept majority judgements from the end of the 16th century." Alder
suggests that the 'status of the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords of which
each member is entitled to make a speech provides a formal constitutional basis for
the practice of dissent in that forum' ,11 though the better approach appears to simply
(1996) 189 CLR I.
Ibid I I (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow 11). See also, Tony
Blackshield and George Williams, Australian Constitutional Law & Theory - Commentary &
Materials (3rd ed, 2002) 1250; Wheeler, above n 4, 284.
(1998) 193 CLR 173.
Boilermakers' Case (1956) 94 CLR 254.
For a survey of cases wherein dissents emerged, see, Alder, above n 5. 222, 233. Alder
identifies the decision of Grindley v Barker (1798) I Bos & Pul 229 as one of the earliest cases
where the inevitability of disagreement was acknowledged.
Alder, above n 5, 233; see also, Bader Ginsburg, above n 5, 135; Alan Patterson, The Law
Lords (1982) 98. Patterson is more explicit in saying that 'since the opinion of a Law Lord is
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accept that minority opinions are really the natural consequence of the senatim
practice of judgment delivery employed in the English courts. Meeting with no
resistance, the practice simply spread as a matter of course to those jurisdictions
founded in the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition. At around the same time, the absence of
any definitive source for a right to dissent in the United States Supreme Court was
demonstrated by its vulnerability to Chief Justice Marshall's determined efforts to
consolidate a practice of unanimity, despite an initial favouring of the seriatim
approach. Justice Johnson's successful resistance to this rested not on his ability to
point to a legal basis for dissent, but simply his refusal to comply and his
persistence in standing up to his Chief Justice. 12
Orth has recently suggested that the development of judicial dissent may owe more
to the challenges which faced the courts of the New World than previously
recognised. He argues that the modification of the common law to the conditions of
the United States, in addition to the task of construing written constitutions,
provided a fertile environment for dissenting opinions which may be contrasted
with '[j]udging between individual litigants on the basis of long-established
common law rules ... in England in the age of Blackstone, a relatively small and
homogenous society'." The American legal climate was instrumental in leading to a
changed 'assumption about whether deliberation on legal subjects by trained judges
is likely to result in disagreement'. 14 Whether one concedes this view or not, Orth is
surely right in his basic conjecture that modem efforts to staff appellate courts with
an odd number of judicial officers reflects that 'we have come to expect (and
accept) disagreement on legal issues'." That this crucial shift - so vital to modern
jurisprudence - occurred largely by stealth owes much to the quiet arrival of the
dissenting opinion.
The ambiguous origins of dissent in domestic tribunals may be contrasted with the
situation in respect of international law courts which, being a phenomenon of the
zo" century and the outcome of vigorous diplomacy, make no such assumptions
and any ability to dissent is indeed a right enshrined in those documents which
13
in constitutional theory a speech delivered in a debate in the Upper Chamber of Parliament ...
the 'encouragement' of repeated withdrawals interferes with the peer's freedom of speech'.
This reflects much of the intangible quality of English constitutional law generally due to its
reliance upon conventions. For, even where dissent was excluded, in the Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council, this was simply a matter of convention (though the 1966 introduction of
dissent in this body is found in a practice order).
See, eg, John P Kelsh, 'The Opinion Delivery Practices of the United States Supreme Court
1790-1945' (1999) 77 Washington University Law Quarterly 137, 143-152; Meredith Kolsky,
'Justice William Johnston and the History of Supreme Court Dissent' (1995) 83 Georgetown
Law Journal 2069; A J Levin, 'Mr Justice William Johnson, Creative Dissenter' (1944) 43
Michigan Law Review 497, 520-3; Donald G Morgan, 'Mr Justice Johnson and the
Constitution' (1944) 57 Harvard Law Review 328,331-5; and Bernard Schwartz, A History of
the Supreme Court (1993) 39.
John V Orth, 'How many Judges does it take to make a Supreme Court' (2002) 19
Constitutional Commentary 681, 690.
Ibid 689.
Ibid 688.
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establish them. Hussain has detailed at length the extensive negotiations which went
into adoption of article 57 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
entitling a judge to deliver a separate opinion when not in agreement with his or her
colleagues." A similar right to dissent was conferred by article 51 (now article 45)
of the European Convention on Human Rights upon the European Court of Human
Rights. 17
The position in respect of the High Court of Australia is essentially an amalgam of
the clarity of international courts with the conventions of other domestic tribunals.
On the one hand, the possibility of formal disagreement amongst judges of the High
Court is certainly recognised by section 23 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) which
resolves the outcome of a case where a difference of opinion exists. But in the
absence of any express 'right' to dissent from a majority view, it is still probably
more accurate to say that the ability to issue such an opinion is simply assumed.
III THEJUDICIALRHETORICOFA 'RIGHTTOADISSENT' - ANDTHREATSTHERETO
Despite the elusive beginnings of dissenting judgments and the absence of any
authoritative basis for the practice in many domestic courts, there has been a strong
tendency among contemporary members of the judiciary to insist that they have a
right to differ from a majority of their colleagues on the institutions on which they
serve. In the case of justices of the United States Supreme Court, this defence of
dissent has unsurprisingly drawn upon its status as a crucial form of speech. Justice
Brennan of that court, argued that no-one 'in our society must ever feel that to
express a conviction, honestly and sincerely maintained, is to violate some
unwritten law of manners or decorum' .18 Indeed, Justice Brennan saw dissent as
both an obligation and a right:
No one has any duty simply to make noise. Rather, the obligation that all of us, as
American citizens have, and that judges, as adjudicators, particularly feel, is to speak
up when we are convinced that the fundamental law of our Constitution requires a
given result .... The right to dissent is one of the great and cherished freedoms that we
enjoy by reason of the excellent accident of our American births. 19
Justice Brennan's colleague, Justice Douglas, and his contemporary, Canada's
Chief Justice Laskin shared a similar view of dissent not merely as a function but a
right of judicial office." And closer to home, and more recently, the High Court's
16
17
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19
Ijaz Hussain,Dissenting and Separate Opinions at the World Court (1984) chapter 1.
Cfthe prohibition on dissent in the Court of Justice of the EuropeanCommunities: Protocol on
the Statute of the Court of Justice, signed at Brussels on 17 April 1957. The different goals of
uniformity and universality go some way towards understanding the acceptability of dissent in
these internationalcourts.
Brennan, above n 5, 437.
Ibid 438.
See, eg, Justice William 0 Douglas quoted in Fuld, above n 5, 926; Bora Laskin, 'The
Supreme Court of Canada: A Final Court of and for Canadians' (\951) 29 Canadian Bar
Review 1038, 1048.
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Justice Kirby has said that '[0]ne of the most distinctive features of the common
law judicial system is the right of appellate judges to express dissenting opinions' .2\
But it should be stressed that the traditional acceptance of minority opinions does
not simply equate with a right to dissent. Sentiments such as those of Justice Kirby
may be strikingly contrasted with just how fragile the ability to dissent has appeared
in the face of proposals for its curtailment.
A requirement of unanimity may be imposed upon the judges of a court from an
internal or external source. The former would seem most likely to arise through the
efforts of the presiding Chief Justice. The classic example is, of course, that of John
Marshall's tenure on the United States Supreme Court to which reference was made
earlier, but it is not an isolated one. A number of the High Court of Australia's
Chief Justices have quite openly sought to secure greater consensus ~ or at least
diminish needless duplication. Dixon apparently desired less individualistic
opinion-writing;" Barwick tried unsuccessfully to establish a formal conferencing
procedure;" and Mason also took steps with a view to increasing the number of
joint judgments." Chief Justice Gleeson has managed to achieve success where
Barwick failed, but stresses that such discussions 'will not always secure agreement
between the Justices and that is not their purpose' .25 Clearly, despite the persistence
of concern about excessive individualism, there has been little heavy-handedness
about the issue in the High Court. But that is not to say that a more aggressive
approach to obtaining unanimity might not be adopted by members of the bench in
the future. An intriguing example is available in the suppression of an individual
dissent by Justice Musmanno of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the 1950s by
order of his Chief Justice. His Honour litigated unsuccessfully for the publication of
his opinion - the final appeal being heard in the very Court of which Justice
Musmanno was a member!"
The more realistic, albeit seemingly unlikely, development is for unanimity to be
compelled by the dictates of the legislature, rather than the judges themselves.
Towards the end of the 19th century, the Canadian House of Commons debated
legislation prohibiting judicial dissent" and ZoBell reported in 1959 that 'at least
two [American] states have experimented with statutory control of the publication
of minority judicial opinions' .28 If those examples seem a little dated, consider the
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Michael Kirby, 'Law at Century's End' (2001) 1Macquarie Law Journal 1, 12.
Philip Ayres, Owen Dixon (2003), 262-3.
See, eg, David Marr, Barwick (1980), 233; Gerald McGinley, 'The Search for Unity: The
Impact of Consensus Seeking Procedures in Appellate Courts' (1987) 11 Adelaide Law Review
203,207-209.
Mason, above n 1, 42.
High Court of Australia, Annual Report 1998-99, 5-6.
See, eg, Michael Musmanno, 'Dissenting Opinions' (1956) 60 Dickenson Law Review 139; K
M ZoBell, 'Division of Opinion in the Supreme Court: A History of Judicial Disintegration'
(1959) 44 Cornell Law Quarterly 186, 209-10.
L'Heureux-Dube, above n 5, 499.
ZoBell, above n 26, 209.
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present position of the New Zealand Court of Appeal. Aside from occasions where
the appeal concerns a question of law on which the Court believes 'it would be
convenient that separate judgments should be pronounced', it is required by law to
desist from the publication of separate judgments in criminal matters."
The possibility of legislative control over the individual expression of members of
the judiciary was not far from the thoughts of Australia's Justice Murphy. In the
case of Federal Commissioner of Taxation v St Helens Farm (ACT) Pty Ltd" he
expressed doubts about the validity of use of the Chief Justice's casting vote in
order to resolve deadlock on an evenly constituted bench. His Honour indicated that
he would feel similar unease about other statutory devices which determined the
status of judicial opinions - including a requirement of unanimity in order for the
court's resolution of a constitutional case to be binding upon the legislature."
Finally, while it is probably only natural to equate the external force for unanimity
simply with the legislature, it is worth noting that serious debate occurred within the
Canadian profession and academy in the early 1950s about 'whether the Supreme
Court of Canada should adopt the practice of the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council and deliver only one judgment in each case'."
In summary, there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that, from time to time,
pressure of various kinds may be exerted with a view to curbing the practice of
dissent. Sympathetic as we may be to ZoBell' s view that:
Even if a jural reincarnation of the Great Chief Justice [Marshall] were to preside, the
idea of imposing judicial silence upon his Associates by external means - whether by
positive law or by the fiat of the Chief Justice - would be intolerable to today's
lawyers and judges,"
experience indicates that interference with individual judicial self-expression is not
so far-fetched as to be easily dismissed as an impossibility. If we value judicial
dissent, then it is necessary to know to what extent it is able to resist attack, and that
requires being definite about what supports the practice and protects it as a judicial
right.
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The full text of s 398( I) of the Crimes Act 1961 (NZ) reads as follows: 'Unless the Court of
Appeal directs to the contrary in cases where, in the opinion of the Court, the question is a
question of law on which it would be convenient that separate judgments should be
pronounced by the members of the Court, the judgment of the Court of Appeal on any appeal
or motion under this Act, and the opinion of the Court of Appeal on any point referred to it or
question of law reserved under this Act, shall be pronounced by the presiding Judge or such
other member of the Court hearing the case as the presiding Judge directs, and no judgment
with respect to the determination of any question shall be separately pronounced by any other
member of the Court.'
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v St Helens Farm (ACT) Pty Ltd (1980) 146 CLR 336.
Ibid 387.
Maxwell Bruce, 'The 1953 Mid-Winter Meeting of Council' (1953) 31 Canadian Bar Review
178,182.
ZoBel!, above n 26, 209-10.33
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IV CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS FOR JUDICIAL DISSENT
There are essentially two possible bases upon which constitutional protection of
judicial dissent might be founded. Probably the first of these to naturally spring to
mind is the notion of constitutionally protected free speech. However, the High
Court has made it clear that the freedom of political communication serves only
those limited instrumental purposes of representative and responsible government
arising from the text of sections 7 and 24 of the Constitution." As such, the freedom
may be overly stretched in defence of dissent. A more plausible (and arguably less
contentious) source for a 'right' to dissent is the repository of curial power found in
Chapter III of the Constitution and the implication that the essential features of its
exercise are to be protected from incursion by the other arms of government."
A Freedom of Political Communication
The assertions from US Supreme Court justices of a right to dissent appear to rest
upon the strong guarantee of freedom of speech found in the American Bill of
Rights. However, Little has argued that, while 'expressing disagreement to one's
colleagues privately; [and] having one's disagreement with the majority's opinion
publicly noted' would certainly be covered by the First Amendment, full
publication of a dissenting opinion alongside the majority judgment is outside the
protection offered." This would seem largely due to the presence of, to use
Australian parlance, other 'legitimate ends' which are served by denying a right for
publication of dissents - such as avoiding costs 'in terms of judge time, court
money, and public disrespect'." Additionally, Little makes the point that 'the First
Amendment is generally held not to require the government to subsidize publication
of speech' .38
Even more serious reservations must exist in this jurisdiction. The freedom of
political communication constitutionally implied by a unanimous High Court of
Australia in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation" is far from simply
analogous to the much broader First Amendment of the United States
Constitution." Several difficulties confront an attempt to use the implied freedom as
a protection of judicial dissent. Firstly, can minority judicial opinions of High Court
justices be characterised as a form of political communication? Although the Lange
test simply refers to 'freedom of communication about government or political
34
36
Lange v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1997) 189 CLR 520, 561 ('Lange').
Of course it is erroneous to refer to any protection of dissent afforded through either the
implied freedom of political communication or the Constitution's separation of judicial power
as a 'right' in the strict sense. Misunderstandings can easily arise through the adoption of the
rhetoric of 'rights' and so it is best to think in terms of a 'guarantee' of judicial dissent.
Rory K Little, 'Reading Justice Brennan: Is There a "Right" to Dissent?' (1999) 50 Hastings
Law Journal 683, 688.
Ibid 699.
Ibid.
(1997) 189 CLR 520.
The Court in that case could not have expressed this more clearly, see ibid 567.
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matters' ,41 the potential width of that expression (as indicated by opinions in the
earlier decisions of Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times" and Cunliffe v The
Commonweaith'n must be seen as restricted by the unanimous judgment's
grounding of the freedom in sections 7 and 24 of the Constitution. The result of
Lange's textual focus is apparently to protect only that communication 'concerning
political or government matters which enables the people to exercise a free and
informed choice as electors'." Having lamented the limitations of this approach
upon its emergence in Lange." Stone later observed that its application in lower
courts had produced a legal meaning of 'political communication' which appeared
to include 'only discussion of laws and policy of the federal Parliament, the conduct
of members of parliament, and non-federal political affairs (such as the political
affairs of a state) that are very closely related to federal matters' .46
To what extent might judicial dissent be eligible for inclusion in the definition of
'political communication'? On an instinctive level, it is tempting to think that
minority judgments - indeed judicial opinions generally - easily fall within the
parameters. They are obviously communicative statements. They may also be said
to be 'political' in a number of ways. Firstly, they frequently concern questions of
the application of governmental power - either through interpretation of statutory
rules or judicial review of executive action. In this sense, the courts and their judges
may be seen to be key players alongside parliamentarians and bureaucrats in the
overall process of government. Secondly, as every jurisprude or political scientist
recognises, the craft of judging is inherently political and laden with public policy.
It smacks of the naivety of the long-dead declaratory theory of the common law to
seriously suggest otherwise.
41
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Lange (I997) 189 CLR 520,567.
(1994) 182 CLR 104, 124-5 (Mason CJ, Toohey and Gaudron JJ).
(I994) 182 CLR 272 ('Cunclijfe'). In that case, a majority offour justices (Mason CJ, Deane,
Toohey and Gaudron JJ) found that the provision of legal advice to aliens seeking visas or
entry permits constituted political speech. Toohey J, however, did not share their Honours'
view that the legislative restrictions on this form of speech were of such a degree that the
protection of the constitutional implication was invoked, and formed a majority on the result
with Justices Brennan, Dawson and McHugh.
Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520, 560.
See, Adrienne Stone, 'Incomplete Theorizing In The High Court' (I998) 26 Federal Law
Review 193, 204. Early on, Stone highlighted the problems arising from Lange's purely textual
focus: 'By tying the content of the freedom of political communication closely to the text of
the Constitution, the High Court identified specific circumstances in which the freedom of
political communication operates, without providing a theory of the freedom. Although the
freedom exists to support some aspects of representative democracy, the High Court has not
fully explained the nature of representative democracy nor how free political communication
might support it.'
Adrienne Stone, 'Rights, Personal Rights and Freedoms: The Nature of the Freedom of
Political Communication' (2001) 25 Melbourne University Law Review 374, 378. On the
matter of State politics, despite the generality of expression employed in Lange which seems
consistent with the earlier finding by majority in Stephens v West Australian Newspapers Ltd
(1994) 182 CLR 211,232 (Mason CJ, Toohey and Gaudron JJ) 257 (Deane J) that the freedom
applied to discussion of that topic, some judges have suggested that the question remains as to
whether the freedom only pertains to the choice of electors atfederal elections: Levy v Victoria
(1997) 189 CLR 579, 596 (Brennan CJ), 626 (McHugh J).
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However, compelling as those admissions are, they have very little to do with the
precise task of determining the scope of 'political communication' as protected by
the constitutionally implied freedom recognised in Lange. Even allowing for some
governmental interconnectedness at either the highest level of abstraction" or the
practical administration of the courts through legislation," it is only realistic to
acknowledge that very few, if any, members of the electorate would be exercising
their choice in a way which reflects consideration of judicial opinions - especially
those in dissent. The two cases since Lange to have considered discussion of the
judicial arm give very clear indications that such communication is simply not
'political' in the requisite sense.
In John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Attorney-General (NSW),49 the New South
Wales Court of Appeal did in fact use the implied freedom to invalidate
amendments to the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) which provided that appeals by
the Attorney-General on questions of law from an acquittal for contempt were to be
held in camera and prohibited publication of the identity of the alleged contemnor
and any submissions made on the appeal. But this was not on the basis of any broad
view that the freedom demanded that the workings of the courts should be open and
free. Instead the link to the implied constitutional freedom was found on the fairly
specific and narrow ground that the actions which the State's Attorney-General was
empowered to pursue (and about which publication was to be restricted) might also
relate to the exercise by the Supreme Court of federal jurisdiction." This argument
was seemingly not one advanced by the claimant. Its first submission was much
wider and was simply that the constitutional freedom of communication about
governmental and political matters encompassed discussion of the conduct of the
judiciary and courts. While this is not a direct argument that judgments amount to
'political communication', that must arguably be a significant component of what
was being put forward. This is especially so when one considers that the context of
the case involved legislation seeking to obscure court processes from public view,
rather than being generally about an ability to criticise or comment on judicial
performance.
47 Which may well explain Mason CJ's claim in Cunliffe that the 'freedom necessarily extends to
the workings of the courts and tribunals which administer and enforce the laws of this
country': (1994) 182 CLR272, 288.
Stone, above n 45, 382.
(2001) 181 ALR 694 ('Fairfax').
Ibid 713 (Spigelman CJ). It seems somewhat surprising that the potential effect of the
legislation upon the hearing of federal matters was used to invoke the implied freedom of
communication, while a majority found that there was no basis for invalidating the legislation
using the principle of incompatibility from Kable v DPP (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51. The facts
seemed much more amenable to a straightforward application of Kable to protect federal
judicial processes, rather than to achieve this through the prism of freedom of communication.
This oddity is compounded by recognition that the division of the bench renders Fairfax a far
from satisfactory authority. Spigelman CJ and Meagher JA declined to apply Kable whereas
Spigelman CJ (with Priestley JA doing no more than agreeing, his Honour having already
concluded the legislation was invalid using Kable) accepted the relevance of Lange. Only the
Chief Justice's opinion reflects entirely the final orders of the Court.
48
49
50
Is Judicial Dissent Constitutionally Protected? 91
The submission - and all that might go with it - was flatly rejected. In doing so,
Spigelman CJ was careful to distinguish earlier obiter statements from members of
the High Court (particularly McHugh J in Stephens v West Australian
Newspapers''v which might be seen as affirming that discussion of the performance
of judicial officers in the exercise oftheir powers was in the public interest:
The inclusion of courts and judges in the scope of the subject matter with respect to
which the public as a whole can be identified to have an interest, for purposes of
applying the traditional rules of reciprocity in the context of qualified privilege for a
defamatory statement, is not coextensive with the constitutional protection of
freedom of communication. That protection, as Lange made clear, is an implication
to be derived from the text and structure of the Constitution insofar as it makes
provision for representative government. The conduct of courts is not, of itself, a
manifestation of any of the provisions relating to representative government upon
which the freedom is based."
The last sentence of this passage is the fundamental obstacle to extension of the
Lange freedom to protect various forms of judicial speech. It has received greater
elaboration, but ultimately confirmation, from the Victorian Court of Appeal in
Herald & Weekly Times Ltd & Bolt v Popovic." The facts here are along more
familiar lines, concerning as they do journalistic criticism and a subsequent action
for libel. However, Popovic was not a politician like Andrew Theophanous or
David Lange. She was a Senior Magistrate and the criticism was directed to her
behaviour during the hearing of a criminal matter in the Magistrate's Court of
Victoria. At first instance, there was some debate as to whether the article in which
Popovic had been defamed was communication of a political or government matter.
The trial judge concluded that it did indeed bear that character as the piece could be
seen as advocating Ms Popovic's removal from office, an action which only the
Attorney-General could initiate. On appeal, only Gillard AJA shared this view,
saying that because of the executive's role in the appointment and removal of
judges and their payment from the public purse 'a discussion of the conduct of a
judicial officer and the way the officer behaves in court is a government matter' .54
This is, of course, distinguishable from a view that the judges themselves are
engaged in political communication, but it might be seen as a step in that direction.
However, the other members of the Court of Appeal in Popovic endorsed the
sweeping dismissal of Spigelrnan CJ in Fairfax of any application of the Lange
doctrine upon the judicial arm. Warren AJA went so far as to reject the suggestion
that the judiciary was included in McHugh J's comments in Stephens about 'public
representatives and officials' by saying those remarks 'although expansive and wide
ranging, [were] confined strictly to matters of government and politics ... [and
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were] not extended to embrace the judiciary'." More directly useful to our present
question, was Winneke ACJ's approval of Spigelman CJ's comments in Fairfax
and his augmentation of them with the statement that:
[T]he conduct of individual judicial officers is carried out independently of the
legislative and executive branches of government, and is not to be described, in my
view, as an exercise of power at a government or administrative level."
In short, there are strong statements in both these cases that the judiciary is outside
the scope of the constitutional freedom of speech. Of the post-Lange cases, Stone
has complained, 'even taking into account the narrow concept of "representative
and responsible" that the High Court has adopted - a much wider range of
communication is relevant to the proper functioning of government at the federal
level' .57 Her criticisms of the scope attributed to the freedom generally are
persuasive, and I would submit that the reasoning in both Fairfax and Popovic is
open to serious challenge. Nevertheless, both cases starkly illustrate the
stranglehold with which the Lange test grips any understanding of what 'political
communication' may encompass. It suffices for these purposes simply to note that,
in light of the case law post-Lange, it would be extremely surprising were the High
Court to take the view that absent access to its minority opinions, electors were
denied' a free and informed choice'.
Even assuming that dissent may be classified as speech of a governmental or
political kind, does its restriction or prohibition really constitute an impermissible
infringement of the freedom? Whilst the clear contribution which minority
judgments make to the work of the Court through the general improvement in the
qualitj of opinion writing, their ability to assist understanding of the majority
reasoning, their demonstration of judicial process and their potential impact upon
future development of the law," make this a more contentious issue, there is,
nevertheless, a difference between recognising the value of dissents and arguing
that they are therefore protected by the implied freedom of communication."
The absence of judicial dissent does not prevent analysis and critique of the Court's
decision - from politicians, the media and interested commentators. It may also be
suggested that by the time a matter is determined by the High Court, the competing
arguments surrounding it would have been fully exposed, not just through the
adversarial process itself, but also by the opportunity for wider discussion by the
protagonists and those with a less direct stake in the litigation. Certainly, the
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By contrast, in the next part of this paper, it will be argued that the various ways in which the
ability to dissent enhances the judicial process of a multi-member court means that they are in
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context of the Lange freedom.
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freedom of speech of any particular Justice who wishes to dissent has been curtailed
but it is otherwise difficult to say that the removal of published dissents seriously
limits the general scope and quality of communication about an issue which has
received the attention of the Court.
To the degree that freedom of speech is denied to individual would-be dissenters,
this might well be justified as
reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end the fulfilment of which
is compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system of
representative and responsible government ... 60
and thus fail to meet the test prescribed by the High Court for infringement of the
freedom. The arguments of Little in respect of the United States First Amendment
about the efficiency and costs of the Court's processes are relevant here." It is
difficult to appreciate how a requirement of judicial unanimity through the removal
of non-binding minority opinions from the curial landscape could be said to be
either disproportionate to achieving the legitimate ends of simplifying the Court's
judgments and obtaining savings in time and money or that such savings themselves
are incompatible with representative and responsible government and thus an
illegitimate end. Once again, the narrow bedrock of the freedom of political
communication ensures that it is of limited assistance in guaranteeing an ability to
dissent.
Lastly, while accepting that the limited jurisprudence surrounding the implied
freedom of political speech means that it is difficult to move much beyond
conjecture, it is appropriate to expect a cautious embrace of the freedom were the
present Court faced with a situation like that being hypothesised. The unanimity in
Lange was clearly based upon uncertain foundations" and four members of the
bench have since been replaced. At the time of writing, the present Court seems
reticent, or in the case of Callinan J, openly hostile," about significantly engaging
with this particular part of its inheritance. Given this reluctance and the controversy
which the emergence of the implied freedom attracted from political and legal
commentators, it seems prudent to recognise that the Court would be unlikely to
defend its own facility for dissenting opinions by recourse to the Lange doctrine -
especially when a far more amenable source of protection lies to hand in the
presence of Chapter III.64
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B The Separation of Judicial Power
Little's study of an American right to dissent resorts to the constitutional separation
of judicial power in order to justify publication of minority opinions. Building
cleverly on the fairly common arguments in favour of dissent on grounds of
accountability and process," he suggests that suppression of dissenting opinions
would amount to an impermissible interference with the judiciary:
The right to issue dissenting opinions can therefore be seen as part and parcel of the
constitutional conception of a federal 'court'. Courts cannot perform fully as we want
them to unless dissents exist to provide a measure for public as well as internal
evaluation.... The function of 'judging' requires a right to independently report
one's views to the public which the judge serves. This view is not only consistent
with our received history, but can be seen as essential to the constitutional function of
an independentjudiciary."
Canada's Justice L'Heureux-Dube supports this argument by saying that dissent
strengthens judicial independence" - though, as shall be seen, whether dissent
merely strengthens such independence, as distinct from being an unassailable
feature of it, is a distinction upon which much could tum.
How might these suggestions from overseas that dissent is protected by the
separation of powers doctrine, be received by the High Court of Australia? Is there
within the Court's recent reinvigoration of Chapter III jurisprudence," any
indication as to whether a similar protection could be found in order to invalidate, to
use Justice Murphy's example from St Helens Farm, an attempt to effectively
outlaw dissent through amendment of the Judiciary Act?69
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Throughout the relevant case law, there are repeated statements to the effect that a
federal court, in order to bear the name of 'court', must possess certain attributes
and observe certain processes which are inherent to a judicial body. The impairment
of these features by another arm of government will amount to unconstitutional
judicial interference. Justice Deane expressed the idea as follows in Polyukhovich v
Commonwealth:
Common sense and the provisions of Ch III, based as they are on the assumption of
traditional judicial procedures, remedies and methodology, compel the conclusion
that, in insisting that the judicial power of the Commonwealth be vested only in the
courts designated by Ch III, the Constitution's intent and meaning were that that
judicial power would be exercised by those courts acting as courts with all that
notion essentially requires ... Nor can it [the Parliament] infringe the vesting of that
judicial power in the judicature by requiring that it be exercised in a manner which is
inconsistent with the essential requirements of a court or with the nature of judicial
power."
This view was echoed in the same case most clearly by Justice Gaudron," who
made generally the same observations in two other cases of 1991.72 The firm
entrenchment of this idea came in the following year's decision of Chu Kheng Lim
v Minister for Immigration." where Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ stated that
grants of Commonwealth legislative power do not 'extend to the making of a law
which requires or authorizes the courts in which the judicial power of the
Commonwealth is exclusively vested to exercise judicial power in a manner which
is inconsistent with the essential character of a court or with the nature of judicial
power'." This fairly straightforward proposition has survived the significant
changes in personnel which the High Court has undergone since."
Accepting then, that the constitutionally implied separation of powers demands
freedom from legislative interference with those features of a federal court which
give it its 'essential character' as such, the question becomes whether the ability to
dissent is such a feature. It is possible, especially in light of Deane J's comments in
75
methodology' of which Deane J spoke inPolyukhovich v Commonwealth (1991) 172 CLR 501:
see text accompanying n 68.
(1991) 172 CLR 501, 607 (Deane J) ('Polyukhovich'). This is an expansion upon Deane 1's
earlier statement in Re Tracey; Ex parte Ryan (1989) 166 CLR 518, 580 that criminal guilt
'can be conclusively determined only by a Ch III court acting as such, that is to say, acting
judicially' .
Polyukhovich (1991) 172 CLR 501, 703-4.
Harris v Caladine (1991) 172 CLR 84, 150-2; and Re Nolan; Ex parte Young (1991) 172 CLR
460,496-7.
(1992) 176 CLR 1.
Ibid 27. It also received an airing in Leeth v Commonwealth (1992) 174 CLR 455,486-7
(Deane and Toohey JJ).
See crucially Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173, 185 (Brennan CJ), 208 (Gaudron J),
220-1 (McHugh J), 232 (Gummow J), 265 (Kirby J); and Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd
(1999) 198 CLR 334,359 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan
JJ).
70
71
72
73
74
96 Macquarie Law Journal (2004) Vol 4
Polyukhovich, to approach this question from an originalist perspective, along the
lines which Little used when discussing the United States Supreme Court:
When the Framers expressly endorsed inferior federal 'courts' and 'judges' in Article
III, they were familiar with the late eighteenth century practice of common law
judges delivering separate opinions that might not always agree ... Thus the Framers'
use of the words embodied an unarticulated, yet constitutionally enshrined,
conception of 'court' and 'judge' that included a right to issue dissenting opinions ...
a court is not a constitutional 'court', and a judge not a constitutional 'judge', unless
statements of dissenting rationale may be issued to accompany the majority's own
opinions."
Whilst this seems plausible enough, I would argue that it cannot suffice by itself to
justify a right to dissent in federal courts in the second century of the Australian
Commonwealth. Originalist methods, while admittedly employed with healthy
frequency in recent years by the High Court, do not have the level of allegiance in
this country which would enable them to quell an alternative interpretation based
upon some other approach. Although Wheeler is quite correct in saying that 'the
definitions of judicial power developed by the High Court have drawn largely from
the historical functions of courts,n the limitations of a purely historical method
have become quite apparent. 78 The case law on s 80 of the Constitution
demonstrates as much. The unanimous judgment of the Court in Cheatle v The
Queen" accepted Griffith CJ's statement from R v Snow80 that the phrase 'trial by
jury' in s 80 must be read in the light of the common law history of England. The
effect of this was to discover, as a matter of history, what was understood by the
drafters ofthe Constitution as the 'essential features' of 'trial by jury' in 1900. Even
then, the Court was quite clear in saying that their view that 'trial by jury' required
a unanimous verdict from the jurors was compelled by 'history, principle and
authority combined'." The need to supplement a historical approach with a more
functional analysis of the constitutional concept of jury had become starkly evident
by the time of the decision of Brownlee v The Queen."
Thus, the trouble I would anticipate for this aspect of Little's argument were it to be
aired before the High Court, is that the Constitution clearly empowers the
Commonwealth parliament to legislate for the federal courts in a number of
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different ways (much more evidently than it enables tinkering with the specific
feature of the jury as expressly guaranteed in s 80) and that is inconsistent with
snap-freezing them as they were understood in 1900. If one is not to engage in this
total original ism, how is it to be discerned that a capacity to deliver dissenting
judgments was intended to be exempt from the legislature's constitutional powers
with respect to the federal courts? The far sounder approach would seem to be to
examine the requirements of the constitutional concept of judicial power as a matter
of principle, practice and function rather than simply a matter of historical
understanding. Is it an infringement of judicial power for the Parliament to require
the High Court to exercise such power with unanimity because to do so is
inconsistent with the essential requirements of a court?
The authorities, of course, do not speak directly to this question, concerned as they
largely are with legislative attention to the circumstances of the criminal trial
process, rather than any attempt to direct the process of adjudication itself." In
some of the judgments, however, there are remarks which go to the requirements of
judicial power beyond simply the hearing of a matter. Justice Gaudron has probably
been the most precise in outlining what she sees as the essential features of the
judicial process as a whole
... those features include open and public enquiry (subject to limited exceptions), the
application of the rules of natural justice, the ascertainment of the facts as they are
and as they bear on the right or liability in issue and the identification of the
applicable law, followed by an application of that law to those facts."
This description of judicial problem-solving can hardly be said to demand a facility
for disagreement. Given, as has already been acknowledged, the nugatory
contribution which a dissenting judgment makes to the court's resolution of the
dispute before it and the law which emerges as a result, it is far from obvious that
the process which Justice Gaudron describes requires (and surely that is the
standard set by a test of 'essential features') the possibility of multiple opinions. It
could be quite plausibly argued that the court as an institution imbued with judicial
power should still be able to fulfil its functions absent any opportunity for
individual dissent. In another context but nonetheless significantly, Justice Deane
acknowledged the relevance of this distinction between the court and the
individuals who comprise it:
The provisions of Ch. III are based on an assumption of traditional judicial
procedures, remedies and methodology. They confer 'jurisdiction', that is, the curial
83 See, eg, Wendy Lacey, 'Inherent Jurisdiction, Judicial Power and Implied Guarantees under
Chapter III of the Constitution' (2003) 31 Federal Law Review 57,58. This probably accounts
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discussion of recent Chapter III case law over a willingness to base implications in the inherent
jurisdiction and powers of the federal courts themselves.
Re Nolan; Ex parte Young (1991) 172 CLR 460, 496. See also Wilson v Minister for
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (1996) 189 CLR I, 11 (Brennan CJ, Dawson,
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power of declaration (dictio) of the law (jus) ... The jurisdiction so conferred is upon
'courts' rather than upon the judge or judges who constitute a particular court."
It is for this reason that statutory control or guidance of judicial discretion may not
of itself represent an infringement upon the judicial power of the court. The
particular parameters of the judicial function may be modified without inhibiting
the essence of the judicial process. This seems to be the basis for the majority's
opinion in Nicholas v The Queen." a case concerned with the validity of a statutory
provision which directed judges to disregard the criminal conduct of law
enforcement officers engaged in obtaining evidence of a narcotics offence by the
accused. In finding, as part ofthe majority, that s 15X of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)
was not a legislative command inconsistent with the essential character of a court
and was therefore valid, Brennan CJ said:
[a] law that purports to direct the manner in which judicial power should be exercised
is constitutionally invalid. However, a law which merely prescribes a court's practice
or procedure does not direct the exercise of the judicial power in finding facts,
applying the law or exercising an available discretion ... The practice and procedure
of a court may be prescribed by the court in exercise of its implied power to do what
is necessary for the exercise of its jurisdiction but subject to overriding legislative
provision governing that practice or procedure."
In this light, the ability to dissent from the Court's finding might be seen merely as
something which has developed in association with, but which is hardly necessary
for, the proper exercise of judicial power. Indeed, a law requiring unanimity would
arguably be ensuring a more coherent and effective judicial process in aid of the
power.
But the arguments which have traditionally supported the practice of dissent may be
invoked at this point to actually evidence its compatibility with the nature of
judicial power, despite the uncertainty and confusion to which it occasionally gives
rise. In particular, the publication of dissenting views is seen as an important
safeguard of the principled and proper exercise of judicial power. As Mathen has
said:
[j]udicial decisions differ from other forms of decision-making chiefly because they
rely on and reflect a pre-existing body of principles. The precise outcome matters
less than the process of identifying relevant principles and applying them to the
dispute at hand. If they are compatible with this process, dissents are not necessarily
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fatal to judicial authority. Instead, their presence may help to assure those who are
expected to abide by the decision, that the process was indeedprincipled."
Acceptance of this contention requires due acknowledgment of the inherently
deliberative nature ofthat particular form of power." While certainly 'identification
of the applicable law, followed by an application of that law' can occur with
unanimity, the reality is that it very often does not - and to no particularly ill effect.
This is because there is much legitimate scope for disagreement over the law. As
Ginsburg has stated, '[d]isagreement on the law or its proper application nowadays
is almost universally admitted to be inevitable some of the time'. 90 The presence of
dissenting judgments provides assurance that the judges are conducting a legal
debate in fulfilling their tasks of identification and application of the law. In short,
the possibility of dissenting opinions ensures that judicial power is in fact - and is
seen to be - exercised with an appropriate focus upon the law, rather than being
simply a smokescreen for decisions based upon morality, economics or public
policy."
The fact that judicial power is regularly wielded by a single judge bench need not
be an impediment to this argument, though it does require us to consider the role of
the individual more closely. In those many instances, the distinctive line between
'court' and 'judge' to which Deane J referred" is blurred and the one becomes more
readily identified with the other. As a result, we can see the permeability of that
division in general - judicial officers (whether sitting alone or in company) are
necessarily bound up with the court as an institution." The sheer practical
impossibility of dissent in a single judge court does not simply mean, as a matter of
logic, that judicial power can be said to be properly exercised by the delivery of a
unanimous opinion from a multimember bench when real disagreement exists. The
conditions under which the power operates are different in either case, but this need
not compel an appreciation of its essential attributes as those fixed by one set of
circumstantial constraints. To do so, is to lose sight of the contribution which
dissenting judgments make to the deliberations and reasons of the court as a
complex institution.
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The grvmg of detailed reasons accompanying the exercise of judicial power -
something which occurs in courts regardless of their composition and in which the
importance of the individual to the institution is most apparent - is surely one of its
most distinctive characteristics. As Wheeler concluded recently:
When the objects and purposes of the exclusive vesting of federal judicial power in
Chapter III courts are examined, however, it is evident that whatever else due process
may mean, judges in federal jurisdiction must resolve disputes by legal reasoning
94
And as Sir Anthony Mason would add, 'the judicial obligation is to state the reasons
and that means to state them fully' .95 As the reasons of the Court are necessarily to
be understood by appreciating not just what a majority of the judges think, but also
what they do not think, as often found in the opinions of the institution's individual
members, surely Mason's exhortation must mean that dissents, in addition to
concurrences, should be made known to the public."
As a matter of practice, it is widely appreciated that the challenge of a potential
dissent is conducive to the production of more thorough and clearer reasoning from
the majority of a court." And so whilst our courts do quite frequently produce
cogent unanimous opinions, it might be that without the prospect ever of a separate
opinion, they could fall to the practice of publishing a single bland judgment
revealing neither the compromises of its various authors, nor the omissions and
failings made by the court in the exercise of its judicial power. Thomas Jefferson
strongly opposed Chief Justice Marshall's enforced unanimity on the United States
Supreme Court for precisely these reasons - that the power of the Court could so
easily be subverted by a few of the Justices."
Stack explained the importance of dissent to the principled exercise of judicial
power as follows:
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The practice of dissent shows that the formation of the Court's judgment involves
not merely a principled extension of its previous decisions, but an 'argumentative
interchange' among its current members. The publication of a single opinion could
be sufficient to demonstrate that the Court's judgment is based on reasons, but the
practice of only delivering a single opinion would not demonstrate that the Court's
judgment is the product of a reasoned dialogue among the Justices. The publicity of
dissenting opinions and the indication of Justices' individual endorsements of
particular opinions reveal that the Justices do confront each other with their
disagreements about matters of principle through the exchange of opinions and the
conversation that surrounds them, if not also in their formal conferences. In this way,
the practice of dissent manifests the exchange of reasons among the Justices that
characterizes their process of decisionmaking; without this practice, those of us
outside the Court would have no way to see the Court as embodying a deliberative
process of judgment.99
Securing the independence of the justices from each other and enabling the
publication of separate opinions may be seen as crucial to ensuring an open and
transparent process of adjudication in accordance with the law - surely an essential
characteristic of a court.
There is some support for this view in the judgment of Justice Gaudron in Re Nolan
when she stated
[t]he determination in accordance with the judicial process of controversies as to
legal rights and obligations and as to the legal consequences attaching to conduct is
vital to the maintenance of an open, just and free society. Quite apart from the
public's right to know what matters are being determined in the courts and with what
consequences, open and public proceedings are necessary in the public interest
because secrecy is conducive to the abuse of power and, thus, to injustice."?
It is clear from the facts of that case (concerning the validity of military tribunals
exercising judicial power) that her Honour's comments are still more targeted to the
trial process itself than the deliberations of presiding justices. But the principle she
is espousing is just as relevant to the latter as it is to the former - indeed, it shares
much of Jefferson's concerns from almost two centuries earlier. Justice McHugh
has indicated agreement with Justice Gaudron by saying that 'open justice is the
hallmark of the common law system of justice and is an essential characteristic of
the exercise of federal judicial power' .101 'Open justice' need not refer simply to the
hearing of a matter in public - but also the dispensing of justice itself through the
giving of clear and honest reasons as to how the final determination was made. That
must include the admission of dissent amongst the bench.
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It is perhaps tempting to overplay the importance of public confidence as a
component of this argument.!" but caution is warranted. A majority of Brennan CJ,
Dawson, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ in Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander Affairs described the public's perception of judicial
independence from the other arms of government as 'central to the system of
government as a whole'!" and went so far as to say:
The separation of judicial function from the political functions of government is a
further constitutional imperative that is designed to achieve the same end [as judicial
tenure], not only by avoiding the occasions when political influence might affect
judicial independence but by proscribing occasions that might sap public confidence
in the independence of the judiciary.
However, two years later in Nicholas v The Queeni" the strength of this view had
noticeably waned. While Gaudron and McHugh JJ repeated their earlier sentiments
that a legislative enactment which tended to 'bring the administration of justice into
disrepute"?' or made it 'more difficult to maintain public confidence'I" in those
courts risked invalidity, and Kirby J gave his express agreement to the statements of
the Wilson majority,'?' the rest of the Court gave far more qualification to those
earlier views or ignored the role of public confidence altogether. The Chief Justice,
with whom Hayne J expressly agreed, said:
To hold that a court's opinion as to the effect of a law on the public perception of the
court is a criterion of the constitutional validity of the law, would be to assert an
uncontrolled and uncontrollable power of judicial veto over the exercise of legislative
power. It would be to elevate the court's opinion about its own repute to the level of
a constitutional imperative. It is the faithful adherence of the courts to the laws
enacted by the parliament, however undesirable the courts may think them to be,
which is the guarantee of public confidence in the integrity of the judicial process
and the protection of the court's repute as the administrator of criminal justice. 108
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ultimately sustain the court in public confidence is the character and independence of the
judges ... and while it may be regrettable that they cannot always agree, it is better that their
independence should be maintained and recognized than that unanimity could be secured
through its sacrifice'.
(1996) 189 CLR I, II. Gaudron J voiced similar sentiments: (1996) 189 CLR 1,25 (Gaudron
J). In the same year, the importance of public perception was critical, yet rather more divisive,
in the case of Kable v DPP (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51.
(1998) 193 CLR 173.
(1998) 193 CLR 173,209.
Ibid 224.
Ibid 265.
Ibid 197. See also ibid 275-6 (Hayne J). Cf265 (Kirby J), 230 (Toohey J). Toohey J contented
himself with simply saying, 'it is not the reputation of the courts which calls for protection; it
is the judicial process itself. Gummow J, despite acknowledging the reliance of the accused
on the majority statement from Wilson (1996) 189 CLR I made no direct comment on the role
which public confidence had to play in the separation of judicial power.
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The effect of the judgments in Nicholas - particularly those of Brennan CJ and
Hayne J - must be to call into question any attempt to curtail legislative action on
the ground that it impacts negatively upon the reputation of the courts and that this
is per se incompatible with the requirements of Chapter III. Questions of public
perception are to be put aside. As Lacey has said in her thorough assessment of
Nicholas
... it may well be that the position endorsed by Gaudron, McHugh and Kirby JJ must
be modified to focus on the power of the court to protect its processes only, rather
than to protect the reputation of the court in administering justice - at least as a
source oflimitation on executive and legislative power.!"
Doing so in no way detracts from the central argument advanced here that the
publication of dissenting opinions is protected simply as a valuable safeguard of the
proper exercise of judicial power.
V CONCLUSION
That the Constitution's separation of judicial power provides a basis for the
protection from interference with the essential characteristics of the judicial process
remains a central tenet of the Chapter III jurisprudence from the last decade."? The
calls by Gaudron and McHugh JJ for 'open justice' in those cases preceding
Nicholas do not rest solely upon a public confidence argument, but upon the
broader base of what is an essential feature of a federal court. Thus it is possible to
maintain the argument offered above: the provision of full and transparent reasons
is an indispensable condition governing the exercise of judicial power, and the
publication of minority judgments is included within that requirement. Therefore,
Justices of federal courts have a right to issue dissenting opinions because the
Constitution, in separating judicial power, guarantees the preservation of those
processes essential to its proper operation and the ability to dissent is one such
process.
While legislation imposing a prohibition on dissent might, on one view, seem to be
merely concerned with procedure rather than 'legislation dealing with questions of
guilt or innocence', 111 the protection offered by the separation of judicial power
must extend to more than the most blatant usurpations of the courts' adjudicative
function. Lacey suggests that 'what is protected under the provisions of [Chapter
III] is the capacity of the federal courts to protect the integrity, efficiency and
fairness of their own processes, as the most basic and fundamental aspect of the
judicial process'. 112 That giving content and meaning to this protection is fraught
with uncertainty and differing opinions does not lessen this 'unavoidable
109
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Lacey, above n 83, 76. This is essentially what Toohey J required in that case, see above n 75.
See Chu Kheng Lim (1992) 176 CLR 1; Leeth v Commonwealth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 486-7.
(1998) 193 CLR 173, 278 (Hayne J).
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obligation"!" But a reasonable case can be made that to speak of the integrity ofthe
courts is to recognise that this must exist in both an institutional and individual
sense. To remove individual independence is to impair the institution as one in
which judicial power is exercised.
113 Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173, 265 (Kirby J).
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